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I. Introduction
In telephony, the Internet, and other markets exhibiting positive network effects—the
value of the service to any user rises with the total number of compatible users—some
cooperation among competing providers is needed to achieve good interconnection so that
customers may enjoy fuller network benefits. However, a firm with a sufficiently large share of
customers may gain by restricting interconnection with its smaller competitors in order to attain a
relative quality advantage over them. This was a central concern, for example, in two prominent
mergers involving so-called “Internet Backbone” providers—firms that supply high-capacity
links with international reach to smaller Internet service providers and large business customers.
1
European and US competition authorities feared that the merged entity would command such a
large share of Internet customers or traffic that it might gain by degrading—or failing to
enhance—interconnection with smaller rivals. Concern with interconnection incentives of
competing networks is reflected also in the US Telecommunications Act of 1996 that requires all
telephone companies to interconnect.
An influential analysis of interconnection incentives is that of Cremer, Rey, and Tirole
(2000; hereinafter CRT),
2 extending the framework of Katz and Shapiro (1985). Networks have
locked-in installed-base customers and compete for new customers in a Cournot fashion.
3 CRT
implicitly assume that networks derive profits only from final customers, not from above-cost
sales of access to other networks. This assumption is appropriate, for instance, if regulation holds
access prices close to marginal cost (or, given balanced inbound and outbound traffic, allows
positive but symmetric margins). Regulators, however, often find it harder to prevent restrictions
of rivals’ network access through non-price methods—what Beard, Kaserman, and Mayo (2001)
term “sabotage”—because of the many ways in which the real cost of access can be raised or its
quality lowered. Degrading interconnection then poses the following tradeoff to the largest
network: its own “quality” suffers and thus the absolute attractiveness of its service declines, but
its attractiveness rises relative to the smaller rival, whose quality has suffered even more. When
the largest firm faces a single rival (duopoly case), CRT provide a sufficient condition on the
size of the installed-base advantage, as a function of the other model parameters, needed to make
degradation profitable. Beyond duopoly, CRT consider an example in which the largest firm
                                                   
1 The MCI/WorldCom merger was concluded in 1998 subject to divestiture of MCI’s Internet operations, while MCI
WorldCom/Sprint was abandoned in 2000 under pressure from the European Commission and U.S. Department of
Justice.  See European Commission (1998; 2000), US DOJ (2000), and WorldCom and Sprint (2000). For useful
background on the Internet, see Cave and Mason (2001).
2 The Appendix is available in the working paper by the same title issued in May 1999.
3 Ennis (2002) considers the case where all customers are locked in but derive value from links to other networks,
and where a large networks bargains with smaller ones over payment for interconnection. He finds that the direction
of payment depends on whether the value of connectivity is linear, convex or concave in the total number of users.- 2 -
commands half the installed base and faces two symmetric smaller rivals. This fifty-percent
share is not enough for the large firm to profitably degrade interconnection with both rivals, but
can make it profitable to pursue “targeted degradation” against only one rival.
Focusing on global degradation, whereby the initially largest network chooses the same
interconnection policy towards all rivals,
4 we extend CRT’s analysis in two directions. First, the
largest network, firm 1, may face any number n of smaller rivals, themselves interconnected.
Second, we analyze the possibility that degradation could lead to tipping—all new customers
gravitating to a single network—a central policy concern in network industries. These extensions
are complementary: allowing an arbitrary number of rivals reveals tipping possibilities that do
not arise under duopoly. If (and only if) firm 1 faces two or more rivals, then degradation could
lead to a unique equilibrium with tipping away from firm 1, even if its installed-base share
exceeds one half. The parameter region that admits this possibility expands with n, while the
region that admits tipping to firm 1 as the unique degradation equilibrium contracts with n. The
driving force is that intra-network competition among the interconnected smaller rivals gives
their network a strategic advantage in its competition with firm 1’s network for new customers,
by enabling their network to commit to a greater expansion of output and thus a greater increase
in quality. This competition-based advantage can, depending on the model’s other parameters
such as the scope for market expansion, outweigh firm 1’s initial advantage in the installed base.
In parameter regions where degradation would not lead to a unique equilibrium involving
tipping (to firm 1 or away from it), it could lead either to a unique interior equilibrium in which
all firms attract new customers, or to any one of three equilibria: the interior equilibrium, tipping
to 1, or tipping from 1. In the multiple-equilibria case, the outcome depends on consumers’
expectations. We characterize the profitability of degradation in each of the cases and summarize
the effect of various parameters on the overall likelihood that—looking across all the other
parameters—degradation would be profitable. As expected, increasing firm 1’s initial market
share is conducive to degradation. Increasing the strength of network effects or the number of
rivals has an ambiguous effect (the latter, in regions where degradation would lead to the interior
equilibrium, rather than tipping as discussed earlier). By contrast, increasing the scope of market
expansion relative to the initial installed base works against profitable degradation, suggesting
that degradation may be a greater concern in mature than in expanding markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the model, which
modifies CRT’s analysis by allowing any number of rivals and, as in Katz and Shapiro (1985), a
potential pool of customers large enough that it is not exhausted in any equilibrium. Section III
analyzes tipping equilibria. Section IV considers also the interior equilibrium, summarizes the
profitability of degradation in various regions, and reports the relevant comparative statics.
                                                   
4 Malueg and Schwartz (2001) analyze the parameter ranges that can support CRT’s targeted degradation example.- 3 -
II. The Model and The Interconnection Benchmark
The model developed in this section is a straightforward extension of CRT’s duopoly
framework:  the largest firm faces n smaller rivals (n = 1 is CRT’s duopoly case).  Unless
otherwise stated, all other assumptions and parameters mentioned below track CRT’s model.
A. The Model
1.  Installed Bases and Interconnection Quality
All firms have constant marginal cost c of serving additional customers.  Firms differ
only in the sizes of their installed bases of existing subscribers.  These subscribers are locked in:
pricing to them is determined by previous contracts, and they will not switch to other networks.
5
The only relevance of installed bases in the model is to potentially affect competition for new
customers.  The total installed base in the market is equal to β (> 0).  Firm 1 has the largest
installed base, of size β1.  The remainder, ββ − 1, is divided among the rivals, with the size of
firm i’s installed base denoted by βi, i = 2, 3, . . . ,  n + 1.  Throughout this paper, a firm’s
“market share” refers to its share of the installed base.
Firms compete for new customers in the next period.  The number of subscribers added
by firm i is denoted by qi. Any customer values equally communication with any other,
regardless of their choices of network.  Thus, if (and only if) interconnection between two firms
is inferior to the quality of connection between subscribers of the same firm, then the firm with
the larger installed base will have an advantage in competing for new customers, because its
network gives access to a larger number of existing users.
The interconnection quality between two firms is denoted by θ, where θ ∈{,} 01.  A
value of θ = 1 represents perfect interconnection, i.e., the same quality as between subscribers on
the same firm’s network, while θ = 0 represents perfect degradation.
6 CRT focus mainly on the
case in which all interconnection qualities entail the same cost, which is normalized to zero. For
this case, they find that firms choose only perfect interconnection or perfect degradation, not
intermediate values of θ, and that firms with the same-size installed bases prefer perfect
interconnection.  For simplicity, we follow this cost assumption and, in light of CRT’s findings,
we model the interconnection among firms 2, 3, . . . , n + 1 as perfect.  Furthermore, we consider
                                                   
5 Foros, Kind, and Sand (2002) extend CRT's model by allowing the  price paid by a firm's installed-base customers
to increase linearly in the number of customers that can be reached through that firm.  They find that this
modification can decrease or increase the larger firm's incentive to degrade interconnection with its rival.
6 Values of θ strictly between 0 and 1 would denote imperfect interconnection—subscribers of firm 1 can potentially
reach those of the other network, but not as well as they can reach other subscribers on network 1 (e.g., the
connection between networks is less reliable or imposes longer delay).- 4 -
only global interconnection policies by firm 1—firm 1 establishes the same interconnection
quality with each of the rivals—and ask whether firm 1 will choose θ = 0 or 1.
2.  Demand by Potential New Customers
a.  Benefits from Subscribing to a Network
If a new subscriber whose type is τ  joins network i, that subscriber obtains gross benefit
of τ + si, where si depends on the size of network i (explained shortly) and τ  can be viewed as
the value of basic access.  New subscribers differ only in their values of τ . Following the
original approach of Katz and Shapiro (1985), on which CRT’s framework builds, we assume
that consumers’ connection-valuation parameter τ  is uniformly distributed over (–∞, 1], (with
density equal to 1 over this interval).
7, 8  Rather than literally envisioning the potential demand as
infinite, we interpret this formulation as capturing the realistic feature that demand dispersion is
so large that there will always be some unserved consumers. The term si is given by
sv L ii = ,
where v > 0 is a common taste parameter measuring the intensity of preferences for connectivity
(hence, the strength of network externalities), and  Li denotes the size of network i, that is, the
total number of links offered by network i next period.
The number Li includes the subscribers (installed-base and new ones) on network i as
well as on other networks with which i interconnects.  Because we have assumed that all smaller
firms will be interconnected, a subscriber of firm i, i ≠ 1, can reach the subscribers of all the
small firms.  If the quality of interconnection between firm i and firm 1 is θ, the number of links
offered by i is therefore given by
(1) Lq q ij
j
n
= − ++ +
=
+




                                                   
7 Exact agreement with Katz and Shapiro’s setting would model parameter τ as uniformly distributed over (–∞, A],
for A > 0.  Our current results would carry through after slight reinterpretation. For example, τ  would be replaced by
τ/A and c would be replaced by c/A.  It is without loss of generality that we assume A = 1.
8 Katz and Shapiro (1985) specifically introduce this “unbounded below” assumption to eliminate problems with
solutions in which all potential consumers are served: “We assume that the support of r has no finite lower limit in
order to avoid having to consider corner solutions, where all consumers enter the market” (ft. 2; their r is equivalent
to our τ).  CRT assume that τ  is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]; this finite pool of potential customers leads to the
possibility of corner solutions for some combinations of parameters. Corner solutions raise issues of  multiple
equilibria (Malueg and Schwartz, 2002, fn. 8).  Malueg and Schwartz (2002) retain CRT’s assumption, but take the
perspective that the plausible market outcome is one in which not all potential customers will subscribe; this
constraint, that the total number of new subscribers be less than the potential pool, yields a restriction on plausible
combinations of the model’s parameters.- 5 -
Thus, if firm i is connected to firm 1 (θ = 1), then a subscriber to i can reach all of the (next-
period) subscribers in the market; but if interconnection with 1 is degraded (θ = 0), then only
subscribers to firm 1’s rivals are reachable from firm i.  Similarly, the number of links offered by
firm 1 is given by









∑ () ( ) βθ β β .
b.  Individual Subscription Decisions and Inverse Demands
The net benefit to customer of type τ  from subscribing to firm i at price  pi is given by
(3) τ + − sp ii .
Regardless of τ, all potential subscribers have the same ranking of various networks’ desirability.
Therefore, firms attracting new customers must offer the same net benefit,
ττ + − =+ − sp sp ii j j ,
which implies that quality-adjusted prices must be equal:
psps ii j j − = − ,
for all networks i, j that acquire new subscribers.  The marginal customer, τ , just obtains a net
surplus of zero from subscription (τ = − ps i i). All customers with values of τ  greater than τ
would subscribe to one of the networks, implying a total number of new subscribers equal to
1−τ .  Therefore, market clearing requires that, for each firm i, we have










so that, using (2) with sv L 11 =  in (4), the resulting inverse demand facing firm 1 is
 (5)
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similarly, the inverse demand facing any smaller firm i is
(6)
ps qq
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for i ≥ 2.- 6 -
We restrict v < 1 to guarantee that demand is downward-sloping (cf., (5) and (6)).
9  Also,
we restrict c ≤ 1 to ensure that some new customers are added under perfect interconnection, no
matter how small the values of v or β: among the potential new subscribers, the highest
willingness to pay under perfect interconnection is at least 1+vβ, which is sure to exceed
marginal cost if and only if c ≤ 1.
3.  Interconnection Choices and Competition for New Customers
Decisions take place in two stages. First, firm 1 chooses whether to interconnect with the
rival network of firms 2, . . . , n + 1. Observing this choice, firms then compete in a Cournot
fashion for new subscribers: each firm chooses the number of customers it wishes to add, and
firms’ prices adjust to yield the quality-adjusted price that clears the market, given the expected
numbers of new subscribers to each firm. Firm 1 chooses its interconnection quality to maximize
its profit in the expected Cournot competition.
 The Cournot profit of any firm i (ignoring the installed-base customers) is simply
πii i pc q = − () , where the quality choice θ  made by firm 1 enters in the inverse demand function
pi discussed earlier.  In choosing interconnection quality, firm 1 faces a tradeoff if its installed-
base share exceeds one half: decreasing θ  makes all networks less attractive, thus drawing fewer
new customers in total (market-contraction effect); but it also gives firm 1 an initial quality
advantage due to its largest installed base (quality-differentiation effect).
B. Equilibrium Under Interconnection
With interconnection by firm 1, all firms offer identical qualities and their services are
perfect substitutes. Using inverse demands given in (5) and (6) with θ = 1, firm i’s profit can be
expressed as
(7) πβ iii i j
ji











≠ ∑ () ( ) , 11
i = 1, 2, . . . , n + 1.  At the Cournot equilibrium, each firm i maximizes its profit given in (7),
taking as given the outputs of its rivals. Given the assumptions that v < 1 and c ≤ 1, the Cournot
equilibrium under interconnection is unique, with each firm adding an identical number of
subscribers equal to
                                                   
9 The role of v < 1 can be understood as follows.  Consider perfect interconnection.  Suppose at price p the marginal
subscriber has personal connection value equal to τ.  If ∆τ  more subscribers are to be added, then the connection
value of the new marginal subscriber must be lower by ∆τ (since τ is uniformly distributed over [0,1]).  The quality
of the expanded network, however, rises by v∆τ, so that the overall value of subscription to the marginal subscriber
(which determines the market price) would fall by just (1 – v)∆τ.  In order for marginal willingness-to-pay actually













As expected, the equilibrium number of new subscribers increases with the installed base β  and
valuation parameter v, as both increase network attractiveness, as well as with the number of
rivals n, and decreases with marginal cost c. Degradation is profitable if it yields firm 1 greater
profit than would this unique interconnection equilibrium.
III. Possible Equilibria Under Degradation
If firm 1 degrades interconnection with its rivals, several types of Cournot equilibria are
possible: a) tipping to firm 1—only it obtains new customers; b) tipping away from firm 1—it
obtains no new customers; and c) the interior equilibrium, in which all firms acquire new
customers. For some parameter values, there exist multiple equilibria—depending on consumers’
expectations, the outcome can be any of the above three equilibria. Figure 1(a) illustrates these
possibilities in (, ) mv 1  space, fixing the other parameters β, c, and n. In region A, the unique
equilibrium is the interior equilibrium; in B, it is tipping to 1; and in C, it is tipping from 1. In D,
all three equilibria exist. As explained below, in Figure 1(a) β is relatively large, while in Figure
1(b) β is relatively small, in which case region B is empty.
This section derives the boundaries,  M 1 and  M1, between these four regions and shows
in each case how the critical value of m1 varies with the parameters v, β, c, and n. Considering
all regions, Section IV examines when degradation is profitable to firm 1.
A. Interior Equilibrium
If firm 1 degrades its interconnection, then its service is no longer a perfect substitute for
that offered by the network formed by the n rivals that are themselves interconnected. In this
case, firm 1 chooses its number of new customers, q1, to maximize its profit
(9) πβ 111 1 1
2
1











Among the rivals, any firm i chooses its number of new customers, qi, to maximize
(10) πβ β iii i j
ji
















If the Cournot equilibrium has all firms adding new subscribers, then the equilibrium outputs are
(11) q
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for firm 1, and
(12) q
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for firm i, i = 2, 3, . . . , n + 1. Note that firm 1’s rivals all have the same number of new
customers, regardless of their individual installed bases, because the rivals are perfectly
interconnected and hence offer identical services.
Equations (11) and (12) provide the unique interior equilibrium as long as these
expressions are well-defined, q
d
1 0 > , and qi
d > 0. The denominators of the expressions in (11)











and they are strictly positive for vv <  and strictly negative for vv > .
10  Therefore, the interior
equilibrium exists in two cases—if the numerators of (11) and (12) are strictly positive for vv <
or strictly negative for vv > :
Case 1: vv n < ()
1(i)  () [ () ] [( ) ( )] 11 1 1 1 0 1 −− ++ + + −− > cn v n n v v n v ββ
and
1(ii) () ( )( ) () 11 2 3 2 2 1 0 1 −−− − + − > cv v v vv ββ ;
or
Case 2: vv n > ()
2(i)  () [ () ] [( ) ( )] 11 1 1 1 0 1 −− ++ + + −− < cn v n n v v n v ββ
and
2(ii) () ( )( ) () 11 2 3 2 2 1 0 1 −−− − + − < cv v v vv ββ .
The conditions of Cases 1 and 2 for the existence of the interior equilibrium can be converted to
conditions on firm 1’s market share, m1, by setting ββ 11 = m  in the above expressions:





















                                                   






























Case 2: vv n > ()












































In Section III.B we derive conditions for tipping equilibria, and in Section III.C we compare
those conditions to the ones for the interior degradation equilibrium discussed above.
B. Tipping Equilibria
1. Tipping To Firm 1
A tipping equilibrium to firm 1 if it degrades interconnection with all rivals is described
as follows.  Suppose each potential new customer expects that any other customer will also
choose firm 1 (or no network at all).  Given such expectations, firm 1 adds its monopoly number
of new subscribers and accepts the corresponding price; taking as given that firm 1 adds this
number of new customers, no rival can profitably attract any new customers, despite the fact that
firm 1’s price is above marginal cost.
11  We now derive the conditions for such a tipping
equilibrium.















This is simply firm 1’s monopoly output—firm 1’s Cournot response to its rivals’ total new
output of zero. Any rival firm i will indeed choose zero output if, given q
Tip
1  and zero output by
the other smaller firms,  pc i ≤  for any qi > 0, where the function  pi is given by (6).  At these
candidate equilibrium outputs, q
Tip
1  and qq n 21 0 == = + L , we indeed have  pc i ≤  if and only if
                                                   
11 Because of the network externalities, entry by a rival on a small scale would deliver a service of low quality,
which would have to be compensated by a prohibitively lower price; entry on a large scale would require a large



















Letting ββ 11 = m , we transform (19) into a condition expressing the minimum market share of
firm 1,  M 1, for which there exists a tipping equilibrium to firm 1 under degradation:
























Lemma 1: ∂∂ Mv 1 0 <  and ∂∂ Mn 1 0 = .  Furthermore,  M
v 1 12 12
= =
/ / .
The proofs of Lemma 1 and subsequent results are given in Appendix 1.  As recorded in the
following remark, Lemma 1 establishes the shape of the  M 1 curve shown in Figure 1.
Remark 1: Fix c, β, and n.  In (, ) mv 1  space, the graph of  M 1 is strictly decreasing in v and
passes through the point (, ) mv 1  = (1/2, 1/2). In addition, this curve is independent of n.
The  M 1 curve is decreasing in v because tipping to 1 can occur for either of two reasons:
network externalities are sufficiently strong or firm 1’s installed-base advantage is sufficiently
large. Increasing the strength of network externalities thus reduces the installed-base advantage
needed for an equilibrium with tipping to 1. The reason  M 1 is independent of n is that 1’s
monopoly output does not vary with n—and the condition for tipping to 1 is that, at 1’s
monopoly output, the rivals’ inverse demand be depressed below marginal cost, c, which also
does not vary with n.
2. Tipping From Firm 1
Next consider a tipping equilibrium away from firm 1 to the rivals’ network. Suppose
each potential new customer expects that no new customer will choose firm 1.  Given such















i = 2, . . . , n + 1.  The outputs q1 0 =  and qq ii
Tip =  indeed form a tipping equilibrium from firm 1

















Therefore, q1 0 =  and qq ii
Tip =  form a tipping equilibrium from firm 1 if condition (22) is
satisfied. Letting ββ 11 = m , we transform (22) into a condition expressing the maximum market
share of firm 1,  M1, for which there exists a tipping equilibrium from firm 1, i.e., tipping is to
the rivals:
























As recorded in the following remark, Lemma 2 establishes the shape of the  M1 curve shown in
Figure 1.
Remark 2: Fix c, β, and n.  In (, ) mv 1  space, the graph of  M1 is strictly increasing in v and
passes through the point (, ) mv 1  = (1/2, 1/(n + 1)). In addition, this curve shifts rightward and
downward as n increases.
The  M1 curve is increasing in v because tipping from 1 can occur if network externalities
are sufficiently strong or firm 1’s installed-base advantage is not too large. Thus, the greater is
m1, the greater is the v needed for tipping from 1. Furthermore,  M1 increases with n because an
increase in n leads to greater Cournot output of the rivals (given q1 0 = ), thereby further
depressing firm 1’s inverse demand. Consequently, tipping from 1 could then occur for  a
somewhat greater installed-base advantage of firm 1 (higher m1).
Let c, β, and n be given and consider Figure 1. Recall that tipping to 1 can occur in the
region above  M 1 and tipping from 1 can occur above  M1. Because 1/(n + 1) ≤ 1/2 for all n ≥ 1,
Remarks 1 and 2 imply that the  M1 curve lies below the  M 1 curve for all m1 12 ≤ / , and strictly
below for m1 12 < / . This observation yields the following lemma.
Lemma 3: Fix m1 12 ≤ / .  If (c, v, β, n, m1) supports an equilibrium with tipping to 1 under
degradation, then it also supports an equilibrium with tipping away from 1, but not vice versa.
The next result is proved in Appendix 1 (recall that vn ()  is defined in (13)).- 12 -
Lemma 4:
(i) Fix n ≥ 1.  If vv = , then  MM 1 1 = ; if vv < , then  MM 1 1 > ; and if vv > , then  MM 1 1 < .
(ii) Fix c < 1 and n ≥ 1.  If β  is sufficiently large, then  M 1 and  M1 intersect at (, ) mv 1  for some
m1 121 ∈[/, ) .
(iii) Fix c < 1 and n ≥ 2.  If β  is sufficiently small, then  M 1 and  M1 do not intersect at any
m1 121 ∈[/, ] .
An implication of Lemma 4 is that if β is sufficiently large, then tipping to firm 1 can be
the unique degradation equilibrium—region B in Figure 1 is nonempty, the case shown in Figure
1(a). On the other hand, if c < 1 and n ≥ 2 and if the installed base β  is sufficiently small, then
the unique degradation equilibrium can be tipping from firm 1, even when 1 has the entire
installed base (m1 1 = ). This possibility is illustrated in Figure 1(b).
C. Uniqueness of Equilibrium Under Degradation
The results of Section III.B collectively show that, for given c, v, β, and n, the
possibilities for tipping equilibria fall into four cases:
A: mM 1 1 <   and  mM 11 >  — no tipping equilibrium;
B: mM 1 1 ≥   and  mM 11 >  — tipping to firm 1 but not from firm 1;
C: mM 1 1 <   and  mM 11 ≤  — tipping from firm 1 but not to firm 1;
D: mM 1 1 ≥   and  mM 11 ≤  — tipping to firm 1 and tipping from firm 1.
This taxonomy of possible tipping equilibria can be linked to the possibility of the interior
equilibrium discussed earlier. Note that the expressions on the right-hand sides of (14) and (16)
are  M1 and the expressions on the right-hand sides of (15) and (17) are  M 1. Moreover, in light
of Lemma 4, case A can arise only if vv < , and D can arise only if vv ≥ .
12  Consequently, case
A admits an interior equilibrium, as does case D if the inequalities in D hold strictly. Therefore,
the equilibrium possibilities are as follows, where each of the cases given above corresponds to
the so-labeled regions in Figure 1:
region A: mM 1 1 <   and  mM 11 >  — the unique equilibrium is interior;
region B: mM 1 1 ≥   and  mM 11 >  — the unique equilibrium is tipping to firm 1;
region C: mM 1 1 <   and  mM 11 ≤  — the unique equilibrium is tipping from firm 1;
region D: mM 1 1 ≥   and  mM 11 ≤  — both tipping equilibria exist, and if these
 inequalities are strict, the interior equilibrium also exists.
The foregoing characterization of equilibrium possibilities is central to determining how model
parameters affect the prospect for tipping and for profitable degradation.
                                                   
12 For vv ≥ , Lemma 4 shows  MM 1 1 ≤ , so there do not exist m1 satisfying  mM 1 1 <  and  mM 11 > —that is, case A
is impossible. Similarly, for  vv < , case D cannot arise.- 13 -
D. Tipping Equilibria and the Number of Rivals
As expected, stronger network externalities (higher v) increase the likelihood of tipping
under degradation—an increase in v lowers the minimal market share of firm 1 needed for
tipping to 1 ( M 1) and raises the maximal share permitting tipping away from 1 ( M1).
More interesting is the effect of the number of rivals, n, on the possibility that
degradation could lead to tipping away from firm 1 even if its initial market share exceeds 1/2.
While Lemma 3 focussed on the case of m1 12 ≤ / , the following proposition considers the case
of m1 12 > / , i.e. firm 1’s installed base is larger than the total base of all its rivals. The following
notation is helpful. Define the sets
Tn c v m m cv nm 11 1 1 12 () (,,, ) | / (,,,, ) => {} ββ  and   supports a tipping equilibrium to 1
and
Tn c v m m cv nm R() (,,, ) | / (,,,, ) => {} ββ 11 1 12  and   supports a tipping equilibrium from 1 .
Thus, Tn 1()  is the set of parameters for which there is tipping to 1, given that 1 faces n rivals;
similarly, Tn R()  is the set of parameters for which there is tipping from 1. Next define
13
Tn T n Tn
u
R 11 () () () ≡−   and   Tn Tn T n R
u
R () () () ≡− 1 .
Thus, Tn
u
1 ()  denotes the set of parameters (together with n) for which the unique equilibrium is
tipping to 1, and Tn R
u()  denotes the set of parameters for which the unique equilibrium is tipping
from 1.
Proposition 1 (Larger Number of Rivals Favors Tipping From 1):  Suppose  m1 12 > / .
(i) For any n, there exist parameters that admit tipping to 1 as the unique equilibrium, and others
for which tipping from 1 is an equilibrium (i.e., the sets Tn
u
1 ()  and Tn R()  are nonempty);
(ii) Tipping from 1 can be the unique equilibrium if and only if  firm 1 faces at least two rivals
(Tn R
u()  is nonempty iff n ≥ 2).
(iii) Increasing the number of rivals increases the scope for tipping from 1 and decreases the
scope for tipping to 1. That is, if  ′′ > ′ ≥ nn 1, then
14
(a) Tn 1() ′′  = Tn 1() ′   and Tn
u
1 () ′′  ⊂ Tn
u
1 () ′ ;
and
(b) Tn R() ′′  ⊃ Tn R() ′   and  Tn R
u() ′′  ⊃Tn R
u() ′ .
                                                   
13 For any two sets X and Y, we denote by X – Y the set of elements of X that are not elements of Y.
14 For any two sets X and Y,  X Y ⊆  denotes that X is a subset of Y;  X Y ⊂  denotes that X is a strict subset of Y. The
symbols ⊇ and ⊃ are interpreted analogously.- 14 -
The properties described in Proposition 1 are illustrated in Figure 2, which is similar to
Figure 1(a) but includes an additional  M1 contour corresponding to a higher number of rivals.
Fix c, β, and  ′ > ≥ nn 2. Because n ≥ 2, the left-side vertical intercept for  M1 lies strictly below
that for  M 1.  Figure 2 depicts the case in which β is relatively large so that  M 1 and  M1 intersect
at some market share m1 1 < . The region of tipping to 1 lies above the  M 1 curve; the region of
tipping from 1 lies below the  M1 curve. Because  M 1 is independent of n, the region of tipping to
1 does not change with n. However, the entire  M1 curve shifts down as the number of rivals
increases from n to  ′ n . Thus, the region of tipping from 1 strictly expands from CD ∪  to
CDBC ∪∪∪′; correspondingly, the region where tipping is uniquely to 1 strictly shrinks from
BB ∪ ′ to  ′ B  and the region where tipping is uniquely from 1 strictly expands to CC ∪ ′.
Given the central role of consumers’ expectations under network externalities, it is not
surprising that there can exist multiple equilibria under degradation (cf. Katz and Shapiro, 1986),
including tipping away from firm 1 even if m1 12 > / . Less obvious is why tipping from 1 can be
the unique equilibrium when m1 12 > / . The answer is that competition among the interconnected
rivals confers an advantage to their network, denoted R, in the inter-network competition against
firm 1. The n rivals’ intra-network competition can commit their network to a higher expansion
of future output, and thus a greater increase of network quality, than can network 1 as a
monopolist.
15
To see the role of competition, recall that a tipping equilibrium to network j (j = 1 or R)
exists if and only if the other network i cannot profitably attract new customers given i’s installed
base (which affects i’s inverse demand function) and taking as given j’s chosen number of new
customers. The number of new customers under tipping to firm 1 is 1’s monopoly solution
conditional on 1’s installed base, q
m
1  (≡ q
Tip
1 , defined in (18)); under tipping to the rivals, the
number is the n-firm Cournot solution conditional on the rivals’ total installed base, Qn
c (≡ nqi
Tip;
cf. (21)). For equal installed bases (m1 12 = / ), competition among the n rivals implies Qq n
cm > 1 ;
by continuity, this inequality can also hold for some m1 12 > / . That is, while firm 1’s larger
installed base increases its network’s attractiveness to new customers and hence its expected
output as a monopolist, this advantage can be outweighed by network R’s ability to act more
aggressively in expanding future output due to competition among its members. The condition
Qq n
cm > 1  in turn makes it possible, for some values of the other parameters c, v, and β, to have a
                                                   
15 The strategic benefits of competition as a vehicle of commitment to higher output have been noted in other
contexts. For example, Schwartz and Thompson (1986) show that an incumbent may gain from establishing
competing divisions for purposes of deterring entry by other firms. Farrell and Galini (1988) show that an innovator
may prefer to have more than one licensee despite the profit destruction caused by licensees’ competition because,
given incomplete contracts, this competition helps assure consumers against future ex post opportunism and thus
induces them to undertake specialized investments complementary to the innovator’s product.- 15 -
unique equilibrium with tipping away from firm 1 despite 1’s initial demand advantage due to its
larger installed base.
16
Several implications follow. First, when m1 12 > / , the possibility of a unique equilibrium
with tipping away from firm 1 requires two or more rivals in order for their network to exhibit
competition among its members, as needed to offset 1’s installed-base advantage. Thus, region C
in Figure 2 can arise only for n ≥ 2.
Second, rivals’ tipping-equilibrium output expands with n. Therefore, the parameter set
for m1 12 > /  consistent with tipping from 1 also expands with n by increasing  M1, thereby
shifting rightward the curve labeled  M1 in Figure 2. By contrast, firm 1’s monopoly output q
m
1  is
independent of n; hence, the parameter set that admits tipping to firm 1 is independent of n.
Thus, an increase in n expands the parameter set for which tipping from 1 is the unique
equilibrium and shrinks the set for which tipping to 1 is the unique equilibrium.
IV. Profitability of Degradation to the Largest Firm
It can be shown that in any equilibrium firm 1’s profit is π11
2 1
** () ( ) = −vq , where q1
*
denotes firm 1’s corresponding equilibrium output. Therefore, in the first stage firm 1 will
choose the interconnection quality (θ = 0 or 1) that gives it the greater equilibrium output.
A. The Interior Equilibrium
First consider parameters values for which the unique equilibrium under degradation is
the interior equilibrium, given by (11) and (12). The discussion in Section III.C implies that a
necessary (but not sufficient) condition is vv < . In this case, firm 1 will prefer degradation if
and only if qq
da
1 > , where these outputs are given by (8) and (11). Let m1 denote the minimum
market share for which firm 1 will find degradation (weakly) preferable when it yields the
interior equilibrium. This threshold market share, m1, is obtained where firm 1’s outputs under
the two regimes are equal, qq
ad = 1 , with the substitution ββ 1 1 = m .  Solving qq
ad = 1  for m1
yields
(24) mc v n
cnn v v n v v n v v
nv n nv
1
22 2 11 1 2 1 3 6 2
21 11
(,, , )
() () () ()( )
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.
                                                   
16 Suppose m1 12 = /  and n ≥ 2. If v = 0, then the absence of network externalities leads to an interior equilibrium in
which all firms’ outputs are equal. Now increase v slightly. While both network 1 and network R have identical
installed bases, the additional competition in network R leads to the interior equilibrium with a greater number of
new subscribers to R than to 1. Consequently, network R has higher quality than network 1. Hence, as v is increased
further, tipping will first occur in the direction of network R. Because this is true for m1 12 = / , it is also be true for
m1 slightly larger than 1/2: there is a range of v for which the unique equilibrium is tipping from 1.- 16 -
Lemma 5: If v <12 / , then m1 12 > / .
The intuition for Lemma 5 has been noted by Cremer, Rey and Tirole (2000, Proposition
5, which discusses their three-firm example). If m1 12 ≤ / , then degradation yields no quality
advantage to firm 1—since the interconnected rivals offer access to at least as many customers—
but reduces all firms’ qualities and thus overall demand by new subscribers. Hence, if
degradation can only yield the interior equilibrium, then firm 1 must have an initial market
exceeding 1/2 for degradation to be profitable.
Figure 3 is identical to Figure 1(a), except that we confine attention to m1 121 ∈[/,]  and
we have added the contour m1, which partitions region A—in which the unique degradation
equilibrium is the interior equilibrium—into two sub-regions: A1, where firm 1’s profit is lower
than under interconnection, and A2 where its profit is higher. Furthermore, it can be shown that
the m1 curve passes through the intersection of the  M 1 and  M1 curves.
17
B. Tipping Equilibria
Naturally, firm 1 will forgo degradation if it expects the outcome to be tipping to its
rivals. If tipping would be to firm 1, degradation presents a tradeoff: firm 1 obtains all the new
subscribers, but the total number of new subscribers falls because degradation reduces product
quality (by denying access to the rivals’ installed base).  Degradation is then profitable if and
only if qq
Tip a
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Because the difference in (25) can be negative, degradation need not be profitable even if it
yields tipping to firm 1. However, the following remark provides a sufficient condition for firm 1
to prefer the tipping equilibrium:
Remark 3: The degradation equilibrium with tipping to firm 1 is more profitable to it than the
interconnection equilibrium if mn 1 22 >+ /( ). Thus, firm 1 prefers the tipping equilibrium if
(i) m1 23 > /  or (ii) n ≥ 2 and m1 12 > / .
                                                   
17 To see this, consider v slightly less than v. Given this value of v, for market shares m1 satisfying  MmM 11 1 <<
the unique degradation equilibrium is the interior equilibrium. But near the endpoints of this interval, firm 1’s profit
approaches that in the two tipping equilibria. At (, ) Mv 1  the degradation equilibrium is tipping from 1, which is
clearly less profitable than interconnection; and at (, ) Mv 1  the degradation equilibrium is tipping to 1, which is
usually more profitable than accommodation (see Remark 3 below). By continuity, there is some market share
between  M1 and  M1 at which firm 1 is indifferent between connection and no connection. As v increases to v, the
interval (, ) MM 1 1  shrinks to a single point, the intersection of the  M1 and  M1 curves.- 17 -
C. Unprofitable Degradation
We shall say that degradation is clearly profitable at (c, v, β, n, m1) if degradation yields
a unique equilibrium and the corresponding profit to firm 1 strictly exceeds its profit under
interconnection. Similarly, degradation is clearly unprofitable at (c, v, β, n, m1) if it yields a
unique equilibrium in which firm 1’s profit is strictly less than under interconnection. In the
other parameter regions the profitability of degradation is ambiguous, depending on which of the
multiple equilibria emerges as the outcome under degradation (which, in turn, depends on
consumers’ expectations).
In Figure 3, degradation is clearly profitable in regions A2 and B (the latter follows from
Remark 3 because n ≥ 2);
18 degradation is clearly unprofitable in regions A1 and C; and its
profitability is ambiguous in region D.  Lemmas 3 and 5 show that if m1 12 ≤ / , then under
degradation either tipping from 1 is possible (in some cases as the unique equilibrium) or the
unique equilibrium is interior and less profitable for firm 1 than is interconnection. This
observation yields the next proposition.
Proposition 2 (Unprofitable Degradation): If m1 12 ≤ / , then degradation (a) is clearly
unprofitable to firm 1 for some parameter values and (b) is never clearly profitable.
D. Potentially Profitable Degradation
To allow the possibility of clearly profitable degradation, we therefore now focus on
m1 12 > / . In this range, we examine how the parameters v, n, m1, c, and β affect the likelihood of
firm 1’s choosing degradation. Specifically, we ask how varying each parameter individually
affects the set P of other parameter values for which degradation is clearly profitable and the set
U for which it is clearly unprofitable. We say that degradation becomes more likely if P expands
and U does not, or if U shrinks and P does not.
1. Network Effects
Increasing the network-effects term v has an ambiguous effect on the likelihood of
degradation. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which fixes β  and c and plots the contour m1 as the
number of rivals n takes the values 1, 2, 4, or 6. For a given n, the top of the corresponding
contour is shown at  vn n n () ( ) = − + () () 12 1  because higher values of v rule out the interior
                                                   
18 Strictly speaking, degradation is not strictly profitable along the leftmost boundary of region A2; rather, here firm
1’s degradation and accommodation profits are equal (qq
da
1 = ). For simplicity, we will gloss over this boundary
consideration in the informal discussion but account for it in the formal proofs.- 18 -
equilibrium being the unique equilibrium under degradation. Figure 4 shows that m1 can be
decreasing in v (for n = 1 or 2), increasing (n = 6) or backward bending (n = 4). Recall that the
unique interior equilibrium under degradation is less profitable than under interconnection to the
left of m1 and more profitable to the right. Thus, an increase in v can cause a move from
unprofitable to profitable degradation—A1 to A2 (e.g., for n = 2), the reverse (for n = 6), or two
switches (from A2 to A1 then back into A2, for n = 4).
Increasing v has an ambiguous effect on the likelihood of degradation also in the range of
v that admits tipping equilibria. Lemmas 1 and 2 showed that increasing v expands the region in
which there exists tipping to 1 and that in which there exists tipping away from 1. Thus, as
Figure 1 illustrates, an increase in v can cause a move into the region (D) of multiple-equilibria
starting from the region (C) of unique tipping away from 1 (thereby increasing the likelihood of
degradation) or, for higher values of m1, starting from the region (B) of unique tipping to 1
(thereby decreasing the likelihood of degradation).
The ambiguous effect of v in our model is partially at odds with CRT’s statement that, by
focusing on values of v low enough to ensure an interior equilibrium rather than tipping, they
have understated the likelihood of degradation.
19 Given that firm 1 has over half the installed
base and faces a single rival, it is true that if network effects are strong enough to make tipping
possible under degradation, then tipping from 1 cannot be the unique equilibrium.  However, if
firm 1 faces at least two rivals (n ≥ 2), then for some values of the other parameters the unique
degradation equilibrium can be tipping from 1. Thus, consideration of tipping possibilities do not
systematically make degradation more likely.
2. Number of Rivals
Figure 4 also shows that increasing the number of rivals n has an ambiguous effect on the
likelihood of degradation in the parameter region where the unique degradation equilibrium
would be interior. This follows from the fact that the m1 contours corresponding to different
values of n intersect. For low v, increasing n expands region A2 at the expense of A1, making
degradation more likely; the reverse occurs for high v. The ambiguity arises because increasing n
serves to reduce firm 1’s profit in the unique interior equilibrium both under degradation and
under interconnection. Observe that the ambiguous effect of n in the region where degradation
leads to the (unique) interior equilibrium is in contrast to the tipping regions, where higher n
made degradation less likely (Proposition 1).
                                                   
19 CRT (2000, p. 455) state: “ ... Larger network externalities would give rise to ‘tipping effects’ and make it more
likely that the industry would be monopolized.”- 19 -
3. Firm 1’s Market Share
An increase in m1 makes it more likely that mm 1 1 >  (so the interior degradation
equilibrium is more profitable than interconnection), or mM 1 1 >  (tipping to 1 is possible), or
mM 11 >  (tipping from 1 is not possible). Such effects can be seen, for example, in Figure 3,
where n, c, v, and β are held constant, as a move into A2 ∪ B, or out of A1 ∪ C.  More formally,
given market share m1, we define
Pc v n c v n m
m1
1 ≡ {} (,, , ) | (,, ,, ) ββ degradation is clearly profitable at 
and
Uc v n c v n m
m1
1 ≡ {} (,, , ) | (,, ,, ) ββ degradation is clearly unprofitable at  .
An increase in firm 1’s market share makes degradation more likely, as reported in the following
proposition.










  Increased scope for market expansion relative to the installed customer base arises if the
base β is lower or if firms’ marginal cost c is lower, since the latter allows a greater percentage
increase in the equilibrium number of new subscribers. In contrast to the ambiguous effects of v
and n, a reduction in β or c makes degradation less likely in both the tipping regions and
interior-equilibrium regions.  As we did for market share, we define the following sets:
20
Pc v n m m n c v n m
β β ≡≥ { } (,,, ) | , (,,,, ) 11 1 2 >1/2,   and degradation is clearly profitable at  ;
Uc v n m m n c v n m
β β ≡≥ { } (,,, ) | , (,,,, ) 11 1 2 >1/2,   and degradation is clearly unprofitable at  ;
Pv n m m n cv nm
c ≡≥ { } (, ,, ) | , (,,,, ) ββ 11 1 2 >1/2,   and degradation is clearly profitable at  ;
and
Uv n m m n cv nm
c ≡≥ { } (, ,, ) | , (,,,, ) ββ 11 1 2 >1/2,   and degradation is clearly unprofitable at  .
For n ≥ 2, degradation is clearly profitable for firm 1 if and only if the unique degradation
equilibrium is tipping to 1 or it is interior and mm 1 1 > ; degradation is clearly unprofitable if the
unique degradation equilibrium is tipping from 1 or it is interior and mm 1 1 < . The following
lemma shows how the boundaries of these regions vary with the market-expansion parameters.
                                                   
20 In this subsection, the sets of parameters for which degradation is profitable or unprofitable also include the
restriction that n ≥ 2.  The reason for this is that when n = 1, equilibrium tipping to 1 can be unprofitable if firm 1’s
market share is less than 2/3.  Rather than imposing more complex assumptions in our discussion of the market
expansion parameters β and c (see Proposition 4), we restrict attention to the case of n ≥ 2.- 20 -
Lemma 6: Fix c < 1.
(i) If  v < 1/2, then ∂∂ Mc 1 0 <  and ∂∂ β M 1 0 < .
(ii) If vn >+ 11 /( ), then, ∂∂ Mc 1 0 <  and ∂∂ β M1 0 < .
(iiii) If v <12 / , then ∂∂ < mc 1 0 and ∂∂ < m1 0 β .
Lemma 6 focuses on the case in which firm 1’s market share is at least 1/2, a necessary
condition for clearly profitable degradation. Therefore, to obtain the comparative statics for  M 1,
M1, and m1, we consider v only over the ranges given. Geometrically, Lemma 6 implies that a
reduction in β or c pivots the  M 1 curve counterclockwise through the point (, )( / , / ) mv 1 1212 =
and pivots the  M1 curve clockwise through the point (, )( / ,/( )) mv n 1 121 1 =+ , with the
intersection of these two curves moving to the right. In addition, the m1 curve is shifted to the
right. These effects are illustrated in Figure 5, which is drawn for the case in which β  is
sufficiently large that  M 1 and  M1 intersect at some m1 1 < . The initial scenario is depicted by the
curves labeled  M 1,  M1, and m1. In this case, the region of clearly profitable region is to the right
of the heavily shaded curve αγδ; after β or c is reduced, the   M 1,   M1, and m1 curves shift in the
directions shown, thereby shrinking the region of clearly profitable degradation to that bounded
by the heavily shaded curve  ′′′ αγδ. Correspondingly, the region of clearly unprofitable
degradation expands from that bounded by δγε to that bounded by  ′′ δγε. These observations
yield the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Market Expansion and Degradation): Increased scope for market expansion
decreases the likelihood of degradation:
(i) If  ′′ < ′ ββ , then P
′′ β ⊆ P
′ β , and the inclusion is strict if P
′ β  is nonempty; also U
′′ β  ⊇ U
′ β ,
and the inclusion is strict if U
′′ β  is nonempty.
(ii) If  ′′ < ′ cc , then P
c′′ ⊆ P
c′ and the inclusion is strict if P
c′ is nonempty; also U
c′′ ⊇ U
c′,
and the inclusion is strict if U
c′′ is nonempty.
The intuition for the above results is as follows. First, consider tipping. Recall that under
tipping to 1 total output equals 1’s monopoly output, q
m
1 , while under tipping to the rivals, total
output is their n-firm Cournot output, Qn
c. As marginal cost c falls, q
m
1  expands by less than does
Qn
c;
22 thus, the competition-based advantage of the rivals’ network is stronger the lower is
marginal cost. A decrease in c, therefore, can both shrink the range of values v for which there
                                                   
22 This follows because the relevant inverse demands differ only in their intercept terms (see (5) and (6)).- 21 -
exists a tipping equilibrium to firm 1 and expand the range for which there exists tipping away
from 1. Turning to the total installed base, a lower β implies—for given market shares—a
smaller advantage to firm 1 in the absolute number of installed-base subscribers. A lower β or a
lower c thus reduces the likelihood that degradation would be profitable to firm 1, because each
effect makes tipping to 1 less likely and tipping away from 1 more likely.
Now consider the parameter region where degradation would lead to the unique interior
equilibrium. For this case, and assuming duopoly, CRT decompose the effect of degradation on
firm 1 into two terms: a decrease in total industry output, and a shift in output from firm 2 to firm
1. In Appendix 2, we extend this decomposition to the case where firm 1 faces n rivals and the
unique interior equilibrium under degradation is stable.
23 We show the following. A fall in β has
two opposing effects: it decreases the output-reduction effect of degradation, since new
customers lose access to fewer subscribers when the installed base is smaller; but it also
decreases the output-shifting effect because, for given market shares, a lower β means a lower
absolute advantage to firm 1 in installed-base customers (hence a smaller gain in quality
advantage from degradation). This second effect dominates, so that on balance, a lower β makes
degradation by firm 1 less likely. Turning to marginal cost, a lower c increases the output-
reduction effect of degradation, because a fall in quality is more consequential when firms are
otherwise inclined to produce higher outputs (i.e., when marginal costs are low). Less obviously,
a lower c also weakly decreases the output-shifting effect (decreasing it strictly with n >1 rivals
and leaving it unchanged with n = 1, i.e., duopoly). Intuitively, a lower c dampens the installed-
base disadvantage of the rivals, because they can more readily compete for new customers. Thus,
both effects of a lower c make degradation less attractive to firm 1.
E. Illustrative Calculations: The Role of Potential Market Expansion
The parameters c, v, and β are difficult to interpret empirically—they have no natural unit
of measure. For example, c is measured relative to the maximum value for interconnection,
which is taken to be v = 1. And the installed base β  might be understood as measured relative to
the number of potential future subscribers. Nevertheless, for services such as Internet
connectivity, one might have estimates of expected growth, given the current number of firms
and assuming interconnection persists. In this section we show how such estimates can be used
to construct safe harbors below which the largest firm in is unlikely to degrade its connection
with rivals.
                                                   
23 It can be shown that the interior degradation equilibrium is stable if and only if v < 1/(n + 1).  In CRT’s duopoly
case (n = 1), whenever the interior equilibrium is the unique degradation equilibrium (vv <= () / 11 2 ) it is also
stable. However, for n ≥ 2, it is the case that 11 /( ) ( ) nv n +< , so there exists a region in which the unique
degradation equilibrium is interior and stable, and another where it is interior and unstable.  Appendix 2 focuses on
the former case.- 22 -
Suppose that under interconnection the overall network would grow by some factor
γ (> 1).  Given parameters c, v, and n, this growth rate is achieved if the installed base equals βγ ,
which is derived as follows. Given parameters c, v, n, and β, if firm 1 pursues global
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If the network is expected to grow by at least factor γ, then
(27)

























The function βγ  is decreasing in γ —a higher potential growth rate is possible when the initial
installed base is smaller.  In this subsection we assume c < 1, so that βγ  is well-defined.
24  But
even then, βγ  (given in (28)) might not be positive for some values of γ and v—this corresponds
to low levels of growth that are simply unachievable.
  Indeed, given c < 1, growth by factor γ > 1
is feasible (by an appropriate choice of β > 0) if and only if the denominator in (28) is strictly















Note that for any γ > 1 and n ≥ 1, vmax strictly between 0 and 1.
Observe that in (28) the term (1 – c) is a factor in βγ .  Therefore, upon substitution of βγ
for β and m1βγ  for β1 in firm 1’s output formulas at the interior and tipping equilibria ((8), (11),
and (18)), c enters only through the factor (1 – c).  Thus, c affects the level of profitability from
degradation, but not whether degradation is profitable.
25  Because we are interested only in
whether firm 1 finds degradation profitable, the normalization ββ γ =  allows us to narrow
attention to the parameters v and m1, given a number n of rivals facing firm 1 and an expected
                                                   
24 From (26) we see that if c = 1, then the growth rate is independent of β.
25 Alternatively, with the substitution ββ γ = , the expression (1 – c) cancels out of the expressions for  M1,  M1, and
m1.- 23 -
market growth factor γ  under interconnection. Thus, for any c < 1, Figure 6 displays the
equilibrium possibilities under degradation, for the cases in which—under interconnection—the
network would grow by 50%, 100%, and 200% when firm 1 faces two or four rivals. As stated in
Proposition 4, greater scope for market expansion indeed increases the market share needed for
the largest firm to profit by degrading interconnection. This pattern is also reflected in Table 1.
γ
1.5 2.0 3.0
n = 2 .529 .595 .731
n = 4 .561 .638 .731
Table 1.  Safe Harbors: the market share m1 below which
degradation is not clearly profitable for firm 1, given
growth factor γ and n rivals to firm 1
If n rivals face firm 1 and the expected growth factor is γ, then degradation is clearly
profitable for firm 1 only in regions A2 and B, where v ranges over the values consistent with n
and γ; that is, from 0 to vmax. The market shares reported in Table 1 correspond to that at the
leftmost point of region A2∪B. If the expected growth factor is γ  and firm 1 faces n
interconnected rivals, then degradation is not clearly profitable for firm 1 if its market share is
below the critical value reported.  In this sense, the values in Table 1 represent safe harbors. In
one respect these safe harbors might be viewed as permissive because firm 1 might be willing to
degrade interconnection when multiple equilibria are possible—if firm 1 believes that of the
several equilibria possible, the one to be realized will be tipping to 1, then firm 1 may degrade
even for market shares below the safe harbors given (see region D in Figure 6). However, in
another sense these safe harbors are quite restrictive. For example, Figure 6(d) shows that when
γ = 2 and n = 4, even for market shares somewhat above the safe harbor of 0.638, degradation
would also be unprofitable for much of the feasible range of v.
V. Conclusion
A central concern in markets with strong network effects is that if one firm attains a high
enough share of locked-in customers—for example, through merger—it may restrict
interconnection with its smaller competitors because its larger customer base then gives it a
quality edge in competing for new customers. A particularly stark risk is that the market would
tip to the large firm, resulting in monopoly. Moreover, a common intuition is that when network
effects are sufficiently strong and all links have equal value, a fifty-percent share of installed-
base customers suffices for tipping to the large firm if it degrades interconnection, because its- 24 -
network then offers access to more links than could the rivals collectively. We showed that this
intuition is flawed whenever the large firm faces two or more rivals: it interconnection is
degraded, the unique equilibrium can be tipping to the rivals (making degradation clearly
unprofitable). Competition among the interconnected rivals serves as a commitment that their
network will expand more aggressively than would a single firm (for the same initial base),
thereby offering higher quality. This competition-based advantage can compensate for the rivals’
smaller installed base. Thus, for a given market share of the large firm, the likelihood of tipping
to the rivals rises with their number or, more generally, with the strength of competition among
them.
The likelihood that degradation would be profitable—whether the market tips away from
rivals or they remain active but contract—decreases as the scope for market expansion relative to
the installed base increases, whether due to lower marginal cost or to greater potential for
demand growth. With greater scope for market expansion, any share advantage in the installed
base becomes less consequential. Thus, for given market shares, the risk that the largest firm
could profitably degrade interconnection is higher in relatively mature industries such as
traditional telephony than in more rapidly growing industries such as the Internet. In rapidly
growing markets, degradation can be unprofitable even if the largest firm controls substantially
more than half the installed base. (Malueg and Schwartz (2002) expand on this point for the
Internet.)
Several caveats to our analysis should be noted, however. We have been agnostic about
what outcome would result when there exist multiple equilibria under degradation, confining our
predictions to cases where there is a unique degradation equilibrium. Degradation becomes more
likely if consumers’ expectations in cases of multiple equilibria would systematically favor the
largest firm (a possibility noted by Farrell and Klemperer, 2002). Secondly, we have focused on
global degradation; as shown by CRT, targeted degradation may be profitable even when global
degradation is not. Finally, and working in the opposite direction, our analysis assumes that the
largest network obtains no profit from sales of access to rivals. Relaxing this assumption can
make degradation of interconnection less attractive.- 25 -
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Appendix 1.  Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.
















where Gvc c v c v (,) ( ) ( )( ) ≡− − −−− + 13 4 2 2
2 β . First observe that Gv v (,) ( ) 12 1 0
2 = − +< β  for
all v > 0. Next consider c < 1. The denominator of (A.1) is strictly positive for v ∈(,] 01;

























which is strictly negative for all 0 ≤ c < 1. It now follows that ∂∂ Mv 1 0 <  for 0 ≤ c ≤ 1.
Finally, substituting v = 1/2 into (20) yields  M
v 1 12 12
= =
/ / .    ///






































Gvc c n c n v n n c n v (,) ( ) ( )() ( )( )( ) ( ) ≡− + −− ++ + +− + () 12 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
2 β .
First, we see Gv nn v (,) ( ) 11 0
2 =+ > β  for all v > 0. Next consider c < 1. With respect to v, G












cn n c n
nc n
(, )
() ( ) () ()
() ()
′ =
− ++− + ()
+ − +





which is strictly positive for all c < 1. Therefore, we can conclude that Gvc (,) > 0 for all v < 1
and c ≤ 1. Hence, from (A.2), the above cases show that ∂∂ Mv 1 0 >  for all 0 < v < 1 and c ≤ 1.
Finally, substituting v = 1/(n + 1) into (23) yields  M
vn 1 1112
=+ =
/( ) / .   ///
Proof of Lemma 4.
(i) It can be shown that
(A.3) MM
cv n n vn v
vv n v v
1 1
2 21 2 4 1 2 1
32 1 2
− =
− + () + − ++ + ()






Because β > 0, c ≤ 1, and 0 < v < 1, it follows that the difference in (A.3) is zero if and only if
02 4 1 21
2 =+− ++ + nn v n v ()() .

















Because  M 1 is decreasing in v and  M1 is increasing in v (Lemmas 1 and 2) and MM 1 1 =  at
vv = , it follows that  vv >  implies  MM 1 1 < .  Similarly, vv <  implies  MM 1 1 > .
(ii) Given c and β, the point of intersection of  M 1 and  M1 is at (, )( ,) mv M v




cn n n n n n
nn
vv 1
21 2 1 1 2 1
22 1
= =







For n = 1, it is the case that  M
vv 1 12
= = / . Moreover, the expression in (A.4) is increasing in n.
Therefore,  M
vv 1 12
= ≥ /  for all n ≥ 1. Taking the limit in (A.4), we have
lim
()










which is strictly positive and less than 1 for all n ≥ 1.- 28 -






which shows that  M 1 and  M1 do not intersect at any m1 1 <  if β is sufficiently small.  ///
Proof of Proposition 1.
(i)  Let  ′ ≥ n 1 be given.  Fix c < 1 and let β > 0 be such that  Mc v
n 1 1 (, , )
′ < β  (see Lemma 4).
Define the market shares
mM c v a n 1 1
1
2
1 ≡ + () ′ (, , ) β
and









  min ( , / , , ), β .
Observe that 12 1 1 / << m a  and 12 1 1 / << m b . Furthermore,
mM c v M c v n a nn 1 1 1 >= ′
′′ (, , ) (, , , ) ββ ,
so at (, , , , ) cv n m
n a ′ ′ β 1  the unique degradation equilibrium is tipping to firm 1 (see Section III.C
and the conditions defining Region B); thus, (, , , ) ( ) cv m T n
n a
u
′ ∈ ′ β 11.
Next, observe that mM c n b 11 34 < ′ (,/, , ) β , so that at (,/, , , ) cn m b 34 1 β ′  degradation can
yield equilibrium tipping from firm 1. Thus, (,/, , ) ( ) cm T n bR 34 1 β ∈ ′
Because  ′ ≥ n 1 was arbitrary, the foregoing shows that for any n ≥1, Tn
u
1 ()  and Tn R()
are nonempty.
(ii) If (,, , ) () cv m T R β 1 1 ∈ , then v > 1/2 (see Lemma 2, and recall that here m1 12 > / ). But for
v > 1/2 it is the case that  M 1 12 < / , so that  Mm 1 1 12 << / , which implies that (,, ,, ) cv m β 1 1
supports tipping to 1 as a degradation equilibrium. Thus, if (,, , ) () cv m T R β 1 1 ∈ , then
(,, , ) () cv m T β 11 1 ∈ , implying that tipping from firm 1 cannot be the unique degradation
equilibrium; that is, TR
u() 1  is empty.











1 min ( , , ), β .
Then  ′> m1 12 /  and
′<= mM c v M c v n
nn 1 1 1 (, , ) (, , , ) ββ ,
so that degradation yields tipping from firm 1 as the unique equilibrium. Thus,
(, , , ) () cv m T n
n R
u β ′ ∈ 1 .- 29 -
The two foregoing cases establish that Tn R
u()  is nonempty if and only if n ≥ 2.
(iii)(a) Fix  ′′ > ′ ≥ nn 1. Because  M 1 is independent of n, it follows that Tn Tn 11 () ( ) ′′ = ′ .  To
show that Tn
u
1 () ′′  ⊂ Tn
u
1 () ′ , we first show that Tn
u
1 () ′′  ⊆ Tn
u
1 () ′  and then show that Tn
u
1 () ′′  ≠
Tn
u
1 () ′ .
Suppose (,, , ) ( ) cv m T n
u β 11 ∈ ′′ . Then at (,, , , ) cv n m β ′′ 1  the unique degradation
equilibrium is tipping to 1, which requires
mM c v 1 1 ≥ (,, ) β
and
mM c vn 11 > ′′ (,, , ) β .
From Lemmas 1 and 2 we know that  Mc v n Mc v n 11 (,, , ) (,, , ) ββ ′′ > ′ . Consequently,
mM c v 1 1 ≥ (,, ) β
and
mM c vn 11 > ′ (,, , ) β ,
which implies that at (,, , , ) cv n m β ′ 1  the unique degradation equilibrium is tipping to 1; that is,
(,, , ) ( ) cv m T n
u β 11 ∈ ′ . Thus, Tn
u
1 () ′′  ⊆ Tn
u
1 () ′ .
To see that Tn
u
1 () ′′  ≠ Tn
u
1 () ′ , fix c < 1 and let β > 0 be such that  Mc v n
n 1 1 (, , , )
′ ′ < β  (see
Lemma 4). Define the market share




1 (, , , ) m i n (, , , ) , ββ .
Then
′> ′ =
′′ mM c v nM c v
nn 11 1 (, , , ) (, , ) ββ
so that (, , , ) ( ) cv m T n
n
u
′ ′ ∈ ′ β 11 .  However, because  Mc v n Mc v n 11 (,, , ) (,, , ) ββ ′′ > ′ , we also have
′>
′ mM c v
n 1 1(, , ) β
and
′< ′′
′ mM c v n
n 11 (, , , ) β ,
so that at (, , , , ) cv n m
n′ ′′ ′ β 1  both tipping equilibria are possible under degradation. Hence,
(, , , ) ( ) cv m T n
n
u
′ ′ ∉ ′′ β 11 .  Thus, Tn
u
1 () ′′  ≠ Tn
u
1 () ′ .
(iii)(b) The proof that Tn R() ′′  ⊃ Tn R() ′   and  Tn R
u() ′′  ⊃Tn R
u() ′  follows the same lines given for
(iii)(a) and so is omitted.   ///- 30 -
Proof of Lemma 5.
It can be verified that
(A.5) m
cn v v n v v vn v v n





21 1 21 1 4 1
22 1 1 1
− =
−− − () + − + − ++ − []
+ − ++ − []
() () () ( ) ()




Because c ≤ 1 and v < 1/2 (recall that vv n < ≤ () / 12  is necessary for the degradation equilibrium
to be interior and unique), it is clear that the expression in (A.5) is strictly positive if the
coefficient of β  in the numerator is strictly positive over the relevant range. Let the function f
denote the coefficient of β; that is,
fv n v v v n v v n (,) ( ) ( ) ( ) ≡−+ − ++ − 21 1 4 1
22 2 .
Observe that
(A.6) fv v v v v (,) ( )( ) 13 72 1 23 0
2 = − += −− >
for v < 1/2.  Also,
(A.7) fv v (,) 24 80 = − >











for all v < 1/2. Because f is convex in n for 0 < v < 1 and  fv (,) 20 >  for all v < 1/2, it now
follows from (A.8) that
(A.9) fv n fv (,) (,) ≥ > 20
for all v < 1/2 and all n ≥ 3.  Inequalities (A.6), (A.7), and (A.9) now establish that the coefficient
of β in (A.5) is strictly positive for all c ≤ 1 and v < 1/2.    ///
Proof of Proposition 3.













. Suppose (,, , ) cv n P
m β ∈
′ 1
. Then the degradation
equilibrium is unique and strictly more profitable than the accommodation equilibrium (so firm
1’s degradation output strictly exceeds q
a). There are two cases to consider: either the
degradation equilibrium is tipping to 1 or it is the interior equilibrium. First, suppose that at
(,, ,, ) cv nm β ′  the unique degradation equilibrium is tipping to 1; then







1 ′ > (degradation is strictly profitable).- 31 -
Then for  ′′> ′ mm 11  it is the case that  ′′> ′≥ mmM 11 1  and   ′′> ′> mmM 11 1 , so the unique degradation










>> , where the
first inequality follows from (18), so the degradation equilibrium at share  ′′ m1  is strictly more




The second case to consider is that at (,, ,, ) cv nm β ′  the unique degradation equilibrium is
interior; then







1 ′ > (degradation is strictly profitable).
Now for  ′′> ′ mm 11  it is the case that  ′′> ′> mmM 11 1 , so there are two subcases to consider: either
′′< mM 1 1, in which case the unique degradation equilibrium is interior; or  ′′≥ mM 1 1, in which
case the unique degradation equilibrium is tipping to 1. In the first case,  ′′< mM 1 1, firm 1’s















(where the first inequality follows from (11)) implying degradation is strictly profitable. In the















11 1 1 1
1
′′ = = ′
≥ => > ,
where the first inequality follows from (18), the equality follows from substitution of mM 1 1 =
into (18) and (11), and the second inequality follows from (18), implying degradation is strictly
profitable. Thus, if at (,, ,, ) cv nm β ′  the unique degradation equilibrium is interior and strictly
profitable, then at (,, ,, ) cv nm β ′′  the degradation equilibrium is unique and strictly more













. Continuing with 12 11 / < ′< ′′ mm ,  fix c = 0 , n = 1, and β > 0 such that
13 2 0 1 + ′′− > () m β  (this last condition guarantees that tipping to 1 is strictly more profitable than
accommodation when firm 1’s share is  ′′ m1 —see (25)). Next define  ′ v  and  ′′ v  as the unique
solutions in v to
′= mMv 11 01 (,, ,) β and ′′= mMv 11 01 (,, ,) β .- 32 -
Then it follows from Lemma 2 that 12 1 / < ′ < ′′ < vv . Now define vv v
* () / ≡ ′ + ′′ 2. Then at
(, , ,, )
* 01 vm β ′′  the unique degradation equilibrium is tipping to 1 and it is strictly more profitable





′′. However, at (, , ,, )
* 01 vm β ′ , tipping from 1 is










Proof of Lemma 6.





















































where the inequality follows because the denominator of the fraction is strictly positive for all















for all vn ∈ + (/ ( ) ,) 11 1 .





















+ − ++ − ()
<









() ( ) () ()
,
where the inequalities follow because n ≥ 1 and we are restricting attention to v < 1/2.   ///
Proof of Proposition 4.
We will prove that if  ′′ < ′ ββ , then P
′′ β ⊆ P
′ β , and the inclusion is strict if P
′ β  is
nonempty. The other conclusions of the proposition are proved analogously.
Let  ′′ < ′ ββ  be given and suppose (,,, ) cvnm P 1 ∈
′′ β . Then the degradation equilibrium at
(,, ,, ) cv nm ′′ β 1  is unique and either tipping to 1 or interior. Suppose it is tipping to 1. Then
mM c v 1 1 ≥ ′′ (,, ) β   and  mM c v n 11 > ′′ (,, , ) β .- 33 -
By Lemma 6 we have  Mc v Mc v 11 (,, ) (,, ) ′′ > ′ ββ  and  Mc v n Mc v n 11 (,, , ) (,, , ) ′′ > ′ ββ , so that
mM c v 1 1 > ′ (,, ) β   and  mM c v n 11 > ′ (,, , ) β ,
implying that at (,, ,, ) cv nm ′ β 1  the degradation equilibrium is unique and interior. Because n ≥ 2,
it follows that at (,, ,, ) cv nm ′ β 1  this tipping to 1 is strictly more profitable to firm 1 than
accommodation. Hence, (,,, ) cvnm P 1 ∈
′ β .
Suppose instead that at (,, ,, ) cv nm ′′ β 1  the degradation equilibrium is unique and interior.
Then
mM c v 1 1 < ′′ (,, ) β   and  mM c v n 11 > ′′ (,, , ) β .
Again by Lemma 6 we have  Mc v Mc v 11 (,, ) (,, ) ′′ > ′ ββ  and  Mc v n Mc v n 11 (,, , ) (,, , ) ′′ > ′ ββ .
Consequently, mM c v n 11 > ′ (,, , ) β  and either (a) mM c v 1 1 ≥ ′ (,, ) β  or (b) mM c v 1 1 < ′ (,, ) β . In
case (a), the degradation equilibrium is unique and it is tipping to 1, which is strictly more
profitable than accommodation because n ≥ 2. In case (b), the degradation equilibrium is unique
and interior, with
mm c v nm cv n 1 11 > ′′ > ′ (,, , ) (,, , ) ββ ,
where the first inequality follows because the interior degradation equilibrium is strictly more
profitable to firm 1 than accommodation at (,, ,, ) cv nm ′′ β 1 , and the second inequality follows
from Lemma 6. Hence, in case (b) firm 1 also finds degradation strictly more profitable than
accommodation. Therefore, (,,, ) cvnm P 1 ∈
′ β .
The foregoing establishes that P
′′ β ⊆ P
′ β . Now suppose P
′ β  is nonempty. We will show
this inclusion is strict. Suppose that (,,, ) cvnm P 1 ∈
′ β . Then under degradation at (,, ,, ) cv nm ′ β 1 ,
the unique equilibrium is either tipping to 1 or the interior equilibrium. First suppose it is the
tipping equilibrium to 1. Then it is also the case that (,,, ) cvnm P 1 ∈
′ β  and at (,, ,, ) cv nm ′ β 1  the
unique equilibrium is tipping to 1, where vv n = ()  for the particular value of n under
consideration. Define the market share




* (,, ,) min ( , , , ), ≡ ′ + ′′ {} () ββ .
Then at (,, ,, )
* cv nm ′ β 1  the unique degradation equilibrium is tipping to 1, so (,,, )
* cvnm P 1 ∈
′ β .
In contrast, at (,, ,, )
* cv nm ′′ β 1  tipping from 1 is possible, so degradation is not clearly profitable,
so (,,, )
* cvnm P 1 ∉
′′ β .
Next suppose that under degradation at (,, ,, ) cv nm ′ β 1 , the unique equilibrium is the
interior equilibrium. Because degradation is strictly profitable, it must be that mm c v n 1 1 > ′ (,, , ) β .
Now define the market share




* (,, , ) m i n (,, , ) , ≡ ′ + ′′ {} () ββ .- 34 -
Then mm c v n 1 1
* (,, , ) > ′ β  and mm c v n 1 1
* (,, , ) < ′′ β , so (,,, )
* cvnm P 1 ∈
′ β   but (,,, )
* cvnm P 1 ∉
′′ β .
The above analysis shows that if P
′ β  is nonempty, then P
′′ β ⊂ P
′ β .   ///
Appendix 2. Decomposing the Effects of β and c on the Largest
Network’s Incentives for Global Degradation
In this Appendix we provide a decomposition of how c and β affect firm 1’s incentives
for degradation.  To understand the effects of the interconnection-quality choice on firm 1’s
equilibrium output, CRT (2000, p. 451) decompose the effect into a “demand expansion effect,”
qq 12
** + , that captures the effect of quality on total output; and a “quality differentiation effect,”
qq 12
** − , that depicts the effect of interconnection quality on firm 1’s advantage in acquiring new
customers.  In this Appendix we introduce a similar decomposition that allows us to analyze, for
n ≥ 1, how firm 1’s incentives for global degradation depend on β and c.
Firm 1’s (interior) equilibrium output, q1
*, can be represented as follows:




















































∑  is firm 1’s advantage in
acquiring new customers, which translates into the increase in its advantage in overall network
quality after new subscribers are added (for n = 1, this effect is positive; for n ≥ 2, it may be
negative).










interconnection quality θ  (either 0 or 1) and installed base β (all other variables, such as market
share and marginal cost, are held constant).  Similarly, let QDE c (,) θ  denote the quality









∑ . Letting qc 1
*(,) θ  denote firm 1’s equilibrium output when it
chooses quality θ  (either 0 or 1) and the common marginal cost is c, we can express firm 1’s
output as a sum of the two terms described above: 2 1 qT o t QQ D E
* =+.  If the difference
qc qc 11 01
** (,) (,) −  is positive, then for cost parameter c, firm 1 would prefer global degradation
over accommodation.  Next we determine how an increase in c affects this difference, holding
the other parameters constant. The terms TotQ and QDE come into play in expressing the effect
of c on these incentives for degradation as follows, with cc h l > :- 35 -
20 1 0 1
00 11
00
11 1 1 qcqc qcqc
TotQ c QDE c TotQ c QDE c




** * * (, ) (, ) (, ) (, )
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=+ () − + () []
− + () − − + () []
= − () −− () {}
+ − () −−
TotQ c QDE c
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(, ) (, ) (, ) (,
11
01 01
01 01 ) ). () {}








for any parameters for which the equilibrium under degradation is interior and stable (recall that
stability requires vn <+ 11 /( )); that is, degradation reduces total output by less when cost is high
than when it is low.  Thus, if parameters yield a stable interior equilibrium under degradation,
then for cc h l > , it follows that
TotQ c TotQ c TotQ c TotQ c hh ll (, ) (, ) (, ) (, ) 01 01 0 − () −− () > .








for any parameters such that the degradation equilibrium is an interior equilibrium (the inequality
is strict if n > 1); that is, degradation increases firm 1’s network quality advantage more when
cost is high than when it is low. Consequently, for cc h l >  we have
QDE c QDE c QDE c QDE c hh ll (, ) (, ) (, ) (, ) 01 01 0 − () −− () ≥ ,
where the inequality is strict for n > 1.  Thus, increases in c produce reinforcing effects that favor
degradation: first, there is a smaller loss in total output from degradation at the higher cost level;
second, firm 1’s increase in its absolute network quality advantage is greater at the higher cost
level.  Hence, the above decomposition yields
20 1 0 1
01 01
01
11 1 1 qcqc qcqc
TotQ c TotQ c TotQ c TotQ c




** * * (, ) (, ) (, ) (, )
(, ) (, ) (, ) (, )
(, ) (, )
− () −− () {}
= − () −− () {}
+ − () )−− () {}
>




Thus, if at marginal cost cl firm 1 is just indifferent between degradation and accommodation,
then at a slightly higher cost level it will strictly prefer degradation.- 36 -
The role of β.  As with the analysis of marginal cost, we letTotQ(,) θβ denote the









∑ , given interconnection quality θ and installed base β, and let









∑ .  The effect of β can be
decomposed analogously to that above, here with ββ h l > :
20 1 0 1
01 01
01
11 1 1 qq qq
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− () −− () {}
= − () −− () {}
+ − () )−− () {} QDE QDE ll (, ) (, ). 01 ββ









for any parameters for which the equilibrium under degradation is interior and stable; that is,
degradation reduces total output by more when the installed base is large than when it is small.
Thus, if parameters yield a stable interior equilibrium under degradation, then for ββ h l > , it
follows that
TotQ TotQ TotQ TotQ hh ll (, ) (, ) (, ) (, ) 01 01 0 ββ ββ − () −− () < .










which says that the increase in firm 1’s network quality advantage from degradation is greater
when the installed base is large than when it is small.  Thus, increases in β have opposing effects
on firm 1’s incentives for degradation.  However, it can be shown that the second effect
dominates the first, so that if at βl firm 1 is indifferent between accommodation and degradation,
then, holding constant firm 1’s share of the installed base, it will strictly prefer degradation for
ββ h l > .
                                                   
26 The only cases in which, for stable equilibria, this derivative is negative arise when n = 2 and firm 1’s market
share is less than 53/104.  But in these situations, when comparing the stable interior equilibrium under degradation
with that under accommodation, firm 1 always prefers accommodation, for all β > 0.  For such cases, changes in β














Figure 1(a). Equilibria Under Degradation (large β )
Region A:  The unique equilibrium is interior
Region B:   The unique equilibrium is tipping to 1
Region C:   The unique equilibrium is tipping from 1
Region D:   Three equilibria exist: tipping to 1, 














Figure 1(b). Equilibria Under Degradation (small β )
Region A:  The unique equilibrium is interior
Region C:   The unique equilibrium is tipping from 1
Region D:   Three equilibria exist: tipping to 1, 



























Figure 3.  Equilibrium Possibilities and Interconnection Choice
No Degradation: region A1 –– degradation leads to worse interior equilibrium for firm 1
!!     region C — degradation leads to tipping away from firm 1
Degradation: region A2 –– degradation leads to better interior equilibrium for firm 1
!            region B — degradation leads to tipping to firm 1
Ambiguous:  region D –– degradation can lead to either tipping equilibriumm1n = 1
m1
n = 2
m1 n = 6
m1 n = 4
Figure 4.  Effects of n on Profitability of Degradation
                When the Unique Equilibrium Is Interior  
                 (β  = 1, c = 0.7)
m1
v





















β '' M1Figure 6.  Equilibrium Possibilities and Interconnection Choice: Market Expansion Scenarios
No Degradation: region A1 –– degradation leads to worse interior equilibrium for firm 1
!!     region C — degradation leads to tipping from firm 1
Degradation: region A2 –– degradation leads to better interior equilibrium for firm 1
!            region B — degradation leads to tipping to firm 1
Ambiguous:  region D –– degradation can lead to either tipping equilibrium
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